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Epistemic consequentialism has been charged with ignoring the epistemic separateness of
propositions and with (thereby) allowing trade-offs between propositions. Here, I do two
things. First, I investigate the metaphor of the epistemic separateness of propositions. I
argue that either (i) the metaphor is meaningfully unpacked in a way that is modeled on the
moral separateness of persons, in which case it doesn’t support a ban on trade-offs or (ii) it
isn’t meaningfully unpacked, in which case it really doesn’t support a ban on trade-offs.
Second, I consider the strategy of arguing against the trade-off permitting conception of
epistemic rationality that is central to epistemic consequentialism on the basis of our
intuitive verdicts about the permissibility of trade-offs in cases. I argue the execution of this
strategy suffers a methodological mistake that, once corrected, vitiates the probative value
of those intuitive verdicts. Hence the conclusion: the separateness of propositions provides
no support for a ban on trade-offs, and an influential independent argument for such a ban
is flawed.
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1. Introduction
Something’s final value is value it has that doesn’t depend on its standing in any relation to
anything else. Familiarly, a hedonistic theory of practical value holds that:1
1. Pleasure has positive final practical value.
2. Pain has negative final practical value.
3. Nothing else has (positive or negative) final practical value.2
Hedonism is naturally paired with the following practical first-order normative theory:
Practical Outcome-Consequentialism (POC): An agent A’s action φ at time t
is practically correct iff A’s φ-ing at t is included in the practically best
outcome available to A at t.
2 See, for perhaps the most famous instance, Mill (1861). For contemporary versions of roughly this sort of
hedonism, see Feldman (2004), Bradley (2009), and Heathwood (2006).
1 The issues here -- terminological and otherwise -- are fraught. For more, see Bradley (2006), Zimmerman
(2001), and Korsgaard (1983). For present purposes, my use is simply stipulative.
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Together, hedonism and POC tell us that the practical correctness of an action is a function
of the pleasure and pain present in outcomes available to an agent at a time.3
Less familiarly, a veritistic theory of epistemic value holds that:
1. True belief has positive final epistemic value.
2. False belief has negative final epistemic value.
3. Nothing else has (positive or negative) final epistemic value.4
Veritism is naturally paired with the following epistemic first-order normative::
Epistemic Outcome-Consequentialism (EOC): An agent A’s belief that P at t
is epistemically correct iff A’s belief that P at t is included in the epistemically
best outcome available to A at t.
Together, veritism and EOC tell us that the epistemic correctness of believing some
proposition is a function of the truth and falsity present in the outcomes available to an
agent at a time. From here on I’ll talk about beliefs being epistemically rational, reasonable,
or justified rather than merely correct.5
Recently, the package of veritism and EOC has come under attack on a number of fronts.6
Here, I’m interested in one particular criticism: that this package allows for illicit
“trade-offs” between propositions. The criticism is simple to state but, as we’ll see, it’s
difficult to pin down. The simple way to state the criticism is via an example. I’ll borrow one
from Selim Berker, who has recently pressed the case against the pairing of veritism and
EOC:
Scientist: Suppose I am a scientist seeking to get a grant from a religious
organization. Suppose, also, that I am an atheist: I have thought long and hard
about whether God exists and have eventually come to the conclusion that He
does not. However, I realize that my only chance of receiving funding from the
6 On theoretical grounds, as in Littlejohn (forthcoming, 2015) and Berker (2013a, 2013b, 2015), and on
empirical grounds, as in James (2017).
5 Here, I follow the opponents of EOC, especially Berker (2013a). More on this in a moment. As with the
pairing of hedonism and POC, there is plenty we can’t read off the combination of veritism and EOC. But,
again, we can safely ignore these complications. For doubts about the parallel between the two pairings, see
Horowitz (forthcoming).
4 See Berker (2013a, 2013b, 2015), Goldman (1999, 2015). This is what Pritchard (2010) calls “T-monism”,
Zagzebski (2004) calls “epistemic value monism” and Ahlstrom-Vij dubs “veritistic value monism” (2013). The
‘monisms’ here highlight clause (3) in our definition.
3 ‘Correctness’ is a placeholder for other normative terms, e.g., ‘obligatory’, ‘right’, etc. These two ideas don’t
tell us plenty, such as how to “weigh up” pleasures and pains, what it means for an outcome to be available to
an agent at a time, whether our obligations are to be understood as actualist or possibilist (c.f. Jackson &
Pargetter (1986)), and so on. We can safely ignore these complications.
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organization is to believe in the existence of God: they only give grants to
believers, and I know I am such a bad liar that I won’t be able to convince the
organization’s review board that I believe God exists unless I genuinely do.
Finally, I know that, were I to receive the grant, I would use it to further my
research, which would allow me to form a large number of new true beliefs
and to revise a large number of previously held false beliefs about a variety of
matters of great intellectual significance.7
According to Berker, “most of us” would agree that forming a belief in God’s existence in
these circumstances would not be epistemically reasonable, rational, or justified. The8
problem, according to Berker, is that if we accept both veritism and EOC then we appear to
be barred from saying this agreeable thing. This is because, were I to form a belief in God’s
existence in these circumstances, I’d be making what according to the pairing of EOC and
veritism looks like an excellent trade-off:
I would be trading off the pursuit of one thing of final epistemic value (true
belief and the avoidance of false belief with regard to the proposition <God
exists>) in order to greatly facilitate my pursuit of a variety of other things of
final epistemic value (true belief and the avoidance of false belief with regard
to the propositions that make up the subject matter of my scientific
research).9
Such trade-offs between propositions licensed by EOC and veritism are reminiscent of
trade-offs between persons licensed by some versions of POC and hedonism: just as the
latter view seems to sometimes require us to sacrifice one person’s pleasure for the
“greater practical good,” the former seems to sometimes require us to sacrifice one
proposition’s truth for the “greater epistemic good.” However, says Berker, in the10
epistemic case such trade-offs are always illicit, and this is because
whereas in the ethical case there is some room for arguing that it is not a
normative mistake to ignore the separateness of persons, [...] in the epistemic
case there is no wiggle room: the epistemic separateness of propositions is
nonnegotiable.11
But: Is it? I am not so sure. In what follows I have two principal aims. The first is to figure
out what, exactly, the “epistemic separateness of propositions” amounts to and, along the
way, to figure out why, exactly, philosophers such as Berker think it’s nonnegotiable. Since
the epistemic separateness of propositions is supposed to be an analog to the moral
11 Berker (2013a, p. 365).
10 Berker (2013a, p. 373, p. 375).
9 ibid.
8 Berker (2013a, p. 364).
7 Berker (2013a, pp. 363-4). Berker himself borrows this example from Fumerton (2001) who in turn adapts
it from one due to Firth (1978).
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separateness of persons, I’ll explore arguments for the nature and negotiability of the
former in parallel with arguments over the nature and negotiability of the latter. Armed
with a clearer understanding of the separateness of propositions, I’ll suggest that hardcore
anti-trade-off-ers (henceforth haters, for short) of Berker’s sort face a dilemma. On the one
hand, haters can model their understanding of the epistemic separateness of propositions
on the moral separateness of persons. But, I’ll argue, we have been given no reason to think
the separateness of propositions, so understood, is absolutely nonnegotiable. Indeed, as I’ll
explain, the moral analogue militates in favor of negotiability. On the other hand, haters can
decline to use the moral analogy. But then we are left with no meaningful content to the
idea that propositions are epistemically separate. In that case, we clearly have no reason to
accept that propositions are in any interesting (non-metaphorical, non-question-begging)
way epistemically separate and so, a fortiori, no reason to think their epistemic
separateness is absolutely nonnegotiable. My second principal aim is to diagnose why
haters might have been led to think that the epistemic separateness of propositions was
absolutely non-negotiable, and so that trade-offs are always banned. I’ll argue that they’ve
been led to this view via a methodological mistake. Let me make two brief preliminary
remarks before getting on with things.
First: as I noted above all haters, i.e., all those who think that epistemic trade-offs are
always forbidden, are my target. But Berker in particular will be my foil: I’ll take him as
representative of the class of views that finds something seriously disturbing about the idea
that it can be epistemically permissible to trade off one proposition’s truth against
another’s. I focus on Berker for two reasons. First, Berker is clearest, among haters, about
what the structure of the argument against trade-offs is supposed to be (this will be
important in pursuing my second principal aim in the latter half of the paper). Second,
Berker is, as far as I can tell, alone among haters in explicitly appealing to the analogues
between the separateness of propositions, on the one hand, and the separateness of
persons, on the other. Since I’m going to spend the first half of the paper arguing that this
analogy isn’t helpful for haters, it might seem I’m loading the die by focusing on Berker in
this way (since only he appeals to it). But as a matter of fact I think it’s a good analogy, in
the sense that it gives voice to the relevant sentiment that is behind haters’ thinking. If
Berker hadn’t offered the analogy on the part of haters, I’d happily do so myself.
Unfortunately, as I’ll argue in the first half of the paper, the analogue doesn’t help -- and
might well undermine -- haters’ position. But that doesn’t mean it’s not worth exploring in
some detail.
The second preliminary remark is this: if I’m successful in achieving my aims, I’ll have
defended the pairing of EOC and veritism against the charge that it allows for objectionable
trade-offs. I’m not the first to offer such a defense. But previous defenses have all, in various
ways, attempted to show that haters’ understanding of veritism or of EOC are somehow
flawed. The idea behind these previous defenses, then, has been that EOC and veritism do
not have the implausible result haters ascribe to it: contrary to what haters say, EOC and
veritism do not “ignore the separateness of propositions” or allow for the trade-offs to
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which haters object. By contrast, my defense of EOC and veritism begins by accepting12
haters’ charge that EOC and veritism sometimes ignores the separateness of propositions
and allows for trade-offs. I’m interested in what, precisely, it means to say this and why,
precisely, we should care if it’s true. What I’m going to argue is that if we make good sense
out of the claim that propositions are epistemically separate, then it turns out we shouldn’t
think such separateness is nonnegotiable; if instead we make a hash out of the idea of
propositions’ separateness, then their separateness really isn’t nonnegotiable. Let’s get on
with it.
2. The Moral Separateness of Persons & The Epistemic Separateness of Beliefs
The claim that propositions are “separate” is a metaphor: to be meaningful, it must be
unpacked. We are told that propositions are “epistemically separate,” but this turns out to
mean that propositions are the sort of thing such that trading one’s truth off against
another’s is always illicit. That’s obviously not much help in the present context. Happily,
haters do provide some guidance: they point us to the separateness of different things in a
different normative domain they think is analogous to the separateness enjoyed by
propositions, viz. the moral separateness of persons. So, let’s take them at their word and
explore the analogy in the hopes of refining our understanding of the separateness of
propositions. What does it mean to say that persons are morally separate?13
The claim that persons are morally separate is no less metaphorical. But proponents of the
idea in the moral domain have said something somewhat more concrete about what they
mean by this idea. Tellingly, moral philosophers regularly appeal to the separateness of
persons in the course of arguing against versions of the pairing noted above between
hedonism and POC. Since epistemologists such as Berker appeal to the analogous idea in
the course of arguing against the analogous pairing of veritism and EOC, it seems we might
be on the trail of our quarry. To get us started, here are a few representative samples of the
idea on the moral side of things:
[Utilitarianism’s] view of social cooperation is the consequence of extending
to the society the principle of choice for one man, and then, to make this
extension work, conflating all persons into one [...] Utilitarianism does not
take seriously the distinction between persons. [Rawls (1971, p. 27).]
There are only individual people, different individual people, with their own
individual lives. Using one of these people for the benefit of others, uses him
and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that something is
done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this
13 Rather than going this route, you might try to offer a neutral characterization of the epistemic separateness
of propositions in terms of their alethic or probabilistic separateness (i.e., either that the propositions don’t
stand in entailment relations or that they are probabilistically independent). But this will not do, for obvious
reasons: even if two propositions stand in the relevant entailment or probabilistic relations, haters will
presumably think trading off one’s truth against another is forbidden.
12 For a few cases, see Singer (forthcoming), Ahlstrom-Vij & Dunn (2014), Goldman (2015), Dunn &
Ahlstrom-Vij (2017); and for a kind of defense against empirical results reported in James (2017), see
Roberts, et. al (2017).
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up. (Intentionally?) To use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect
and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only
life he has. [Nozick (1974) pp. 32-33]
[Consequentialism] treats the desires, needs, satisfactions, and
dissatisfactions of distinct persons as if they were the desires, etc., of a mass
person. [Nagel (1970, p. 134)]
[...] [S]uppose that mankind is a super-person, whose greatest satisfaction is
the objective of moral action. . . . But this is absurd. Individuals have wants,
not mankind; individuals seek satisfaction, not mankind. A person’s
satisfaction is not part of any greater satisfaction. (Gauthier (1962), p. 126;
cited in Norcross (2009).)
The basic problem with standard versions of core consequentialism is that
they fail to recognize adequately the normative separateness of persons.
Psychological autonomous beings (as well, perhaps, as other beings with
moral standing) are not merely means for the promotion of value. They must
be respected and honored, and this means that at least sometimes certain
things may not be done to them, even though this promotes value overall.
[Vallentyne (2006) p. 29; cited in Norcross (2009).]
Importantly, despite some of the misleading language (especially in the Nagel, Nozick, and
Gauthier quotes), the point here is not a metaphysical one about the fact that persons enjoy
distinct existences. And, correspondingly, the fundamental mistake those who ignore the14
separateness of persons make is not a metaphysical one. For even supposing there were,
metaphysically speaking, such a thing as a “mass-” or “super-person” comprising what we
ordinarily think of as individual persons, those concerned with the moral separateness of
persons would think this was neither here nor there when it came to how, morally
speaking, we should treat the component persons that make up such a super-person. The
mistake, in other words, is not in thinking that super-persons exist, but is instead in
thinking that super-persons are, when it comes to what we are morally obliged to do, the
appropriate foci of our normative thought.
Vallentyne’s quote is perhaps the clearest on this point, though each of these authors makes
it clear elsewhere that it is the normative -- not metaphysical -- separateness of persons
that concerns them. As Vallentyne characterizes it, the normative separateness of persons
consists in the fact that they must be “respected and honored” and not merely treated as
“means for the promotion of value.” And in his later work, Rawls says that it is distinctive of
persons that they are “self-authenticating sources of valid claims,” requiring our respect.15
Below I’ll discuss this in some more detail. For now, we can simply note that each of these
authors, in different ways, understands the normative separateness of persons as placing
restrictions on the appropriateness of certain trade-offs between what is good for one
person and what is good for another. Since it’s something like this latter claim that haters
15 Rawls (2005, pp. 32, 72, 100)
14 c.f. Norcross (2009).
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want to make regarding the epistemic separateness of propositions (i.e., that there are
restrictions on the appropriateness of trade-offs between them), it looks like we’ve found
our analogue.
Let’s dig in to the analogy a bit further. First notice that, in the moral domain, it is persons
that are separate in the sense that there are restrictions on trading off what’s good for one
person against what’s good for another. This suggests that the correct epistemic analogy is
in terms of the separateness of beliefs not propositions. To explain: recall our two theories of
value. Hedonism claims persons’ pleasure has positive final practical value. Veritism claims16
true belief has positive final epistemic value. Restrictions on trade-offs between persons on
the basis of their separateness are restrictions on trading off one person’s thing hedonism
says is valuable against another person’s thing hedonism says is valuable. So, if we mean to
make the analogous claim in epistemology, we should not say that the issue is over whether
there is a ban on trade-offs between propositions. Veritism doesn’t say anything about the
value of propositions. If there are restrictions on trade-offs, they are restrictions on trading
off what’s good for a particular belief against what’s good for a separate belief. Our question
about the epistemic separateness of propositions is, properly, a question about the
epistemic separateness of beliefs.17
With this in mind, the idea is that, just as persons are separate in the sense that there are
restrictions on their good being be traded off against another person’s good, so beliefs are
separate in the sense that there are restrictions on their truth being traded off against
another belief’s truth. This seems to be exactly what haters have in mind. Recall Berker’s
example of the atheistic scientist. What was supposed to be objectionable, according to
Berker, was that in those circumstances he was considering trading off the negative value of
his false belief in God against a range of other true beliefs concerning the subject matter of
his scientific research.
All this should be uncontroversial. It’s simply making explicit the analogue between the
moral separateness of persons and the epistemic separateness of beliefs (propositions)
alluded to by haters such as Berker. The interesting thing, as I’ll now explain, is what
happens when we take this analogue seriously.
4. Interpersonal and Interdoxastic Aggregation of Value
If persons are normatively separate in the way just described, what follows with respect to
the permissibility of trade-offs between persons, i.e., interpersonal trade-offs? An insistence
on the absolute non-negotiability of the normative separateness of persons would entail it
was never morally permissible to sacrifice (any amount of) one person’s good in order to
17 You might think that in the present context we distinguish between token beliefs on the basis of their
propositional content. Thus the “separateness of propositions” and the “separateness of beliefs” comes to one.
But that will not do. For veritism says that your true belief that P is as much a bearer of epistemic value as my
true belief that P.
16 Hedonism doesn’t quite say this: it says that pleasure (whoever’s) is finally practically valuable. For present
purposes, we can ignore this complication and assume that the only relevant bearers of pleasure are persons.
This is because, when it comes to the epistemic analog of hedonism, i.e., veritism, the only relevant bearers of
truth are beliefs.
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bring about (any amount of) any number of persons’ goods. In other words, insistence on
the absolute non-negotiability of the normative separateness of persons entails an absolute
ban on interpersonal trade-offs. But an absolute ban on the interpersonal trade-offs leads
to absurd first-order results. It entails that it is never morally permissible to sacrifice one
person’s life in order to save five lives, or five million, or even five billion; a strict ban on
interpersonal trade-offs entails it’s never morally permissible to give one person a short
mild headache in order to save five billion lives. Assuming, as Alistair Norcross puts it, that
we don’t want to follow those who insist on such a ban to the “funny farm,” we should reject
an absolute ban on interpersonal trade-offs and accept, instead, that it is at least sometimes
morally permissible to trade-off one person’s good against another’s.18
Why accept the moral permissibility of interpersonal trade-offs? One reason is, as I’ve just
said, is that rejecting it leads to absurd results -- we end up at the funny farm. Another
reason, which matters more in the present context, is that even the most ardent proponents
of the moral separateness of persons accept interpersonal trade-offs. This is worth pausing
over for a moment. Rawls is often credited with his celebration of the separateness of
persons. But even Rawls doesn’t end up endorsing a view according to which interpersonal
trade-offs are completely off the table. Even he thinks interpersonal trade-offs are
negotiable.
Perhaps the most obvious illustration of the negotiability of such trade-offs in Rawls’s
theory is his commitment to a principle of distributive justice requiring that inequalities in
wealth and income be justified by their positive contribution to the position of the least
well-off in a society. This is his famous “Difference Principle,” which says that differences in
inequality in income and wealth arising from the arrangement of the basic structure of
society are justified only if those differences make the least well-off in society better off
than they otherwise would be under some alternative arrangement. Implicit in the19
Difference Principle, then, is the permissibility of some interpersonal trade-offs. This is
because the Difference Principle forbids (mere) Pareto improvements in a distribution
where some people, viz. the best-off in a society, could be made better off without
worsening -- but also without improving -- the position of the worst-off in that society.
Hence the Difference Principle says it is licit -- indeed, that we are required -- to trade-off
the good of some persons (those comprising the best-off ) against the good of some other
persons (those who comprising the worse-off).
I myself don’t have a theoretical stake in the moral separateness of persons. But if those
who care most for and have thought hardest about the moral separateness of persons think
that separateness is compatible with at least some interpersonal trade-offs, I’m inclined to
believe them. So, here I won’t be arguing any further for this idea. Let emphasize how
minimal the assumption I’m making here is. Again, I’m not arguing, here, in favor of any
particular conception of how, precisely, we ought to trade-off value between persons. The
Difference Principle’s particular claim about how to value trade-offs is controversial. That’s
not surprising, since it amounts to the claim that we should value the difference between
19 Rawls (1971, especially the discussion beginning on p. 76).
18 Norcross (2009, p. 80). In fact Norcross argues for trade-offs without bound. But here I need only the
weaker assumption.
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the good of the best-off after a (mere) Pareto improvement and their good prior to that
improvement at zero. But we don’t need to accept the Difference Principle’s idiosyncratic
claim about how to value trade-offs between persons to think it’s obvious that, sometimes
at least, trade-offs between persons are morally permissible and, most importantly, are not
ruled out by the “separateness of persons.” And I’m certainly not arguing that unrestricted
interpersonal trade-offs, i.e., the view according to which there are no theoretical
restrictions on how we can trade-off value between persons, is compatible with the
separateness of persons. That would be a quite controversial assumption.
What about the corresponding claims in the epistemic case? What does the epistemic
separateness of beliefs, understood analogously to the moral separateness of persons, give
us reason to think about the permissibility (or not) of trade-offs? Here we come to the crux
of things. For notice that, as we’ve just seen, a commitment to the moral separateness of
persons is broadly compatible with interpersonal trade-offs. But then, by analogous
reasoning, it seems we should accept trade-offs between beliefs, i.e., interdoxastic trade-offs.
Here is why. The epistemic separateness of beliefs is best understood as a normative matter
just as the moral separateness of persons is best understood as a normative (not
metaphysical) matter. In the moral case, separateness entails a set of restrictions on how
persons can be treated: restrictions, in other words, on trading-off one’s good against
another’s. But, again, those restrictions do not constitute absolute bans on interpersonal
trade-offs. That way lies the funny farm, and in any case the proponents of the moral
separateness of persons don’t themselves sign up for such absolute bans on trade-offs. So,
in the epistemic case, the separateness of beliefs should be understood, I’m now busy
suggesting, as entailing a set of restrictions on how beliefs can be treated: restrictions, in
other words, on trading-off one’s truth against another’s. But the idea that there are some
restrictions on interdoxastic trade-offs does not amount to the idea that there is an absolute
ban on them. Moreover, insofar as we take seriously the analogue from the moral case,
we’ve good reason to think even the most ardent proponents of the epistemic separateness
of beliefs will, like their counterparts in moral theory, allow for (restricted) trade-offs.
At the very least, and here’s the important point, we’ve been given no reason by haters to
think the situation is substantively different in the epistemic case than it is in the moral.
Worse, it appears that the best way of cashing out the otherwise obscure metaphor
regarding the separateness of beliefs, viz. by analogy with the moral separateness of
persons, gives us positive reason for thinking trade-offs will sometimes be permissible. In
fact, since haters themselves encourage the analogy between the two domains, they thereby
encourage the thought that what’s goes for trade-offs between morally separate persons
(they’re permissible, with restrictions) goes for trade-offs between epistemically separate
beliefs (they’re permissible, with restrictions). Haters therefore face a dilemma.
On the one hand, they can have a plausible conception of the epistemic separateness of
beliefs. The most plausible conception -- suggested by haters themselves, and modeled on
the moral separateness of persons -- gives us no independent reason for thinking that there
is an absolute ban on trade-offs between beliefs. If we understand the epistemic
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separateness of beliefs as the epistemic analogue of the moral separateness of persons, we
should accept that trade-offs will sometimes be epistemically permissible.
On the other hand, haters can reject the conception of the epistemic separateness of beliefs
modeled on the moral separateness of persons. I haven’t argued, here, that this rejection
would be unworkable or even unreasonable. If haters reject the conception of the epistemic
separateness of beliefs modeled on the moral separateness of persons, they cannot then
remain silent on what the epistemic separateness of beliefs is supposed to amount to. Such
metaphors are meaningless unless unpacked. And, importantly, it cannot turn out that what
it is for beliefs to be epistemically separate is for it to be such that their truth cannot ever be
appropriately traded-off against another belief’s truth. That would beg the question against
the proponent of the package of EOC and veritism. I’m not optimistic about the prospects
for haters giving a meaningful alternative conception of beliefs’ epistemic separateness that
doesn’t simply beg the question in this way; but whether it can be done remains to be seen:
if they take this route, the burden is now on haters to tell us what they mean.
This might seem unfair to haters. Berker, at least, is explicit about the fact that he thinks
there are structural disanalogies between the moral and the epistemic domains. And it’s20
reasonable to assume Berker thinks it is these disanalogies that explain why the moral
separateness of persons is negotiable and therefore allows for trade-offs whereas the
epistemic separateness of beliefs is not, and so does not. After all, it’s Berker himself who
points to the disanalogy in setting up his claim initially. As he says, unlike in the moral case,
“in the epistemic case there is no wiggle room.” But what I am presently urging is that we21
are owed an explanation for this lack of wiggle room. And the appeal to the metaphor of the
separateness of beliefs (or propositions) is no help at all. At best, it confuses matters.
5. Cases and Cases
Still, you might have worries. Perhaps I’m placing far too much emphasis on a catchy turn of
phrase. (In my defense, I’m trying here not just to bury the phrase but to make sure it’s
dead when I do.) This can seem unfair to the hater. What she cares about isn’t defending her
use of a bit of language (the “separateness of propositions”), but instead her view about
trade-offs (they’re always forbidden). And after all, the worry continues, Berker has an
explanation for the lack of wiggle room in the epistemic case that doesn’t appeal to
anything about separateness: according to him, epistemic rationality is non-promotive, in
the sense that it’s not concerned with promoting some valuable end such as true belief. So,
what’s important is not the epistemic separateness of beliefs (propositions), whatever that
turns out to mean. What’s important (a hater might say) is why we should think that
epistemic rationality is non-promotive. So (says our hater), forget about arguments over
separateness; instead, focus on arguments over whether epistemic rationality is promotive.
In this section, I address this issue.
So: Why do haters think that epistemic rationality is non-promotive, i.e., not concerned with
promoting some independently valuable end such as true belief? The answer is precisely
21 Berker (2013a, p. 365).
20 Berker (2013a, 2013b, 2015).
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the one Berker gives: because of our judgments about cases. Recall, again, haters’ intuitions,
which we’re invited to share, about cases such as Berker’s:
Scientist: Suppose I am a scientist seeking to get a grant from a religious
organization. Suppose, also, that I am an atheist: I have thought long and hard
about whether God exists and have eventually come to the conclusion that He
does not. However, I realize that my only chance of receiving funding from the
organization is to believe in the existence of God: they only give grants to
believers, and I know I am such a bad liar that I won’t be able to convince the
organization’s review board that I believe God exists unless I genuinely do.
Finally, I know that, were I to receive the grant, I would use it to further my
research, which would allow me to form a large number of new true beliefs
and to revise a large number of previously held false beliefs about a variety of
matters of great intellectual significance.
According to Berker, “most of us” would not think that a belief in God was reasonable, or
rational, or justified, in these circumstances. As we know, haters’ point isn’t about how to
value trade-offs: their point is not that in this case, all things considered, it would be
unreasonable to believe in God in order to further one’s research (because, say, the research
furthered isn’t sufficiently important). Instead, their point is that such trade-offs are always
forbidden. It’s important to be clear on this point, so I’ll pause over it for a moment.
It can help to put things in terms of reasons. Haters’ point is not that the epistemic reasons
in favor of believing in God (because it will further one’s research) are outweighed by the
epistemic reasons against doing so (because, say, it’s something one thinks is false). Instead,
haters’ view is that the epistemic reasons in favor of believing in God in this case do not
exist. We know this is haters’ view because their central thought isn’t one about how to
value trade-offs -- about how much (important) truth we’d have to put up against how
much (important) falsehood for things to come out equals-pequals. If that were haters’
central thought, then it’d be utterly mysterious why they think such trade-offs are always
forbidden. After all, it’d be possible to imagine the sort of case where the scales tip in favor
of the trade-off. But, and again, haters think such trade-offs are always forbidden. In the
language of the misleading metaphor from the previous section: the epistemic separateness
of beliefs is non-negotiable.
But as I’ll now explain, this way of arguing for the non-promotive nature of epistemic
rationality, and so in favor of an absolute ban on trade-offs, via our judgments about cases,
suffers a serious methodological mistake that vitiates its probative value. The mistake is
one Mark Schroeder identifies in a different context, and it’ll be helpful to work our way
into the mistake as made by haters by first looking at the instance identified by Schroeder:22
22 In unpublished work, Daniel Wodak marshals this same diagnosis of a symmetrical methodological mistake
in a different domain, viz. arguments regarding the reasons we have on the basis of normative (and in
particular aesthetic) testimony. I am in complete agreement with what he says there, which is, roughly, that
arguments for the conclusion that we lack reasons for attitudes on the basis of normative testimony that go by
way of our intuitive verdicts about the wrong (or no) comparison cases are not probative.
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In a first version of the case, you see Tom Grabit come out of the library, pull a
book from beneath his shirt, cackle gleefully, and scurry off. Intuitively, you
have a reason to believe that Tom just stole a book from the library. But in a
revised version of the case, Tom has an identical twin, Tim, from whom you
cannot visually distinguish him. If you’re aware of this, then it turns out that
you don’t have any reason to believe that Tom stole a book after all. Right? Of
course that’s right. This, after all, is a classic case of an undercutting defeater,
and as everyone knows, undercutting defeaters make it the case that things
that would otherwise have been reasons for you, instead are not.
This is a natural thought about the case, but your intuitions mislead you. That
you still do have some reason to believe that Tom stole a book can be
observed by comparison with yet a third version of the case. In the third
version, Tom and Tim have a third identical sibling, Tam. In this case, you
have even less reason to believe that Tom stole a book than in the second, and
so in the second it can’t have gone away entirely. By similar reasoning, you
still have a reason to believe that Tom stole a book even in the third case,
because there is a fourth case in which there are four identical siblings and
your reason to believe that Tom stole a book is still worse.23
Schroeder’s point explicitly concerns undercutting defeat. But in the present context, what’s
important is the more general lesson we can draw from Schroeder’s examples, viz. that we
can be led into intuitive error about the (non-) existence of (epistemic) reasons by failing to
draw the right comparisons between cases -- either by using the wrong comparison case or
by failing to use any comparison case whatsoever. That, in short, is the mistake haters24
make. Let me explain.
If the lesson of Schroeder’s Grabit example is that our intuitive verdicts regarding the
existence of epistemic reasons can be misled by failing to use the correct comparison case,
then failing to use any comparison case whatsoever in coming to an intuitive verdict
regarding the existence of epistemic reasons -- as we’re asked to do in, e.g., Berker’s
atheistic scientist case, might equally well mislead. And that, I think, is exactly what’s
happened. To see this, consider the following case, which I’ll call:
Inept Scientist: Suppose I am a scientist seeking to get a grant from a
religious organization. Suppose, also, that I am an atheist: I have thought long
and hard about whether God exists and have eventually come to the
conclusion that He does not. However, I realize that my only chance of
receiving funding from the organization is to believe in the existence of God:
they only give grants to believers, and I know I am such a bad liar that I won’t
be able to convince the organization’s review board that I believe God exists
unless I genuinely do. Finally, I know that, were I to receive the grant, I would
24 Schroeder himself uses the case to draw a lesson about out intuitions regarding reasons quite generally,
including our intuitions about practical reasons. See Schroeder (2004, esp. pp. 93 and following) for
discussion.
23 Schroeder (2004, p. 93).
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use it to further my research, which would allow me to form a small number
of new true beliefs and to revise a small number of previously held false
beliefs about a variety of matters of minimal intellectual significance.
Note that Inept Scientist is exactly like Berker’s Scientist, except that, whereas in Scientist
the grant from the religious organization allowed me to form a large number of new true
beliefs and revise a large number of previously held false beliefs about a variety of matters
of great intellectual significance, in Inept Scientist, I form a small number of new true
beliefs and revise a small number of false beliefs about matters of minimal intellectual
significance. I hereby invite you to think (presumably in agreement with haters) that
forming a belief in God’s existence would not be epistemically reasonable in these (Inept
Scientist) circumstances. But that all-out verdict, that it would be epistemically
unreasonable to form a belief in God’s existence in these circumstances, isn’t the verdict I’m
interested in exploring.
Instead, consider the essentially comparative judgment about Inept Scientist as opposed to
Scientist. We should agree that it is less reasonable to believe in God’s existence in Inept
Scientist than it is in Scientist. If you’re not convinced, consider a third version of the case
that is exactly like Inept Scientist except that one doesn’t form any new true beliefs (and so
only revises a small number of previously held false beliefs about matters of minimal
intellectual significance). Or consider a fourth version of the case that is just like the third
version but where still fewer false beliefs are revised. In each of these successive cases, the
correct intuitive verdict seems to be that one is progressively less justified or less reasonable
in forming a belief in God’s existence in the circumstances one finds oneself in.
Let’s put this again in the language of reasons. The intuitive verdict about Inept Scientist is
that you have less reason to believe in God’s existence in those circumstances than you do in
Scientist. And similarly for the third and fourth versions of the case: these are cases where
you have progressively less and less reason to believe in God’s existence. But if this is so,
then in Scientist you must have some reason to believe in God’s existence. This is because in
Inept Scientist we know that your reason to believe hasn’t gone away entirely; and similarly
for the third and fourth versions of the case: you still have reason to believe in God’s
existence in Inept Scientist because in the third (and fourth) version of the case you have
less (and still less). And so examples such as Scientist do not put the lie to a promotive
conception of epistemic rationality, since when we consider such examples in comparison
to other cases, we see that there is some epistemic reason in such cases, which is what the
promotive conception of epistemic rationality predicts.
In sum, then: haters’ view that epistemic trade-offs are always forbidden is not meant to be
tied to verdicts about all-things-considered rationality in particular cases. Their view is that
there is an absolute ban on trade-offs because epistemic rationality is non-promotive. So,
it’s not supposed to be essential to the force of the examples meant to support this view
that we agree with haters about the all-things-considered verdict in any given case. What’s
supposed to be essential is the intuitive verdict that in the relevant cases there is no
epistemic reason at all in favor of the belief in virtue of (potential) trade offs. Let’s suppose
we grant, for the sake of argument, that we share this intuitive verdict in one-off cases. This
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does not show, what it is supposed to show, that we share haters’ view that epistemic
rationality is non-promotive. This is because when we contrast our verdict about such cases
with suitably modified versions of the cases, the intuitive verdict there is that there is still
less reason in these modified cases -- even if the overall verdict (i.e., the judgment about
whether the trade-off is here permissible, whether it would be reasonable or justified) is
the same. But if there is still less reason in the modified cases, then there must be some
reason in the unmodified cases, contrary to our initial intuition. That is Schroeder’s lesson.
So, in the cases (modified and unmodified alike) there must be some reason, in virtue of the
fact that doing so would promote true belief (and promote the avoidance of false belief), to
believe. And so epistemic rationality is (at least in part) promotive, contrary to haters’
claim.
I’ll close by considering one final rejoinder. Perhaps this is still unfair to haters -- and
especially to Berker -- since it might seem to rely on the details of particular examples, and
in other work Berker explicitly eschews such reliance as the right way to understand his
arguments:
I do not mean my argument to rest too heavily on these particular examples.
The important point is not the examples themselves, but rather the structure
of the examples. As I see it, my [...] argument against epistemic
consequentialism involves not a series of counterexamples, but rather a
recipe for generating counterexamples. [...] this recipe makes my style of
argument particularly versatile: even if fault is found with the specific
examples I have offered in this essay, my recipe allows me to find other
examples of a structurally similar sort that suffice to make the same point.25
But what I’ve just argued is that there is a structural flaw in Berker’s recipe, and so it can’t
be used to cook up the results he wants. He’s failed to recognize that some ingredients in it,
to taste right in the cake, are essentially comparative: the sugar must be weighed against
the flour. Less culinarily: our intuitive verdict about any single case that believing P is
unreasonable despite the fact that so believing would best promote overall epistemic value
doesn’t show that epistemic rationality is non-promotive. This is because, as we just saw,
when we compare our verdict about such a case to one where believing P would less well
promote the epistemic values, our judgment is that it would be even more unreasonable to
believe P in that case. And that means, again as we just saw, that it must be that there is
some reason to believe P in the first case -- and so epistemic rationality must have some
promotive component (for that is what explains the existence of the reason). At best, then,
what our intuitive verdicts about these singleton, non-comparative, cases suggest is that
there are some restrictions on epistemic trade-offs; our intuitive verdicts don’t deliver the
result that such trade-offs are absolutely forbidden.
6. Summary
Haters object to the pairing of veritism and EOC on the grounds that it ignores the
epistemic separateness of beliefs (propositions) and thereby allows for objectionable
25 Berker (2013b p. 378; emphasis in original).
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epistemic trade-offs. I’ve argued here the metaphor of separateness of beliefs is at best
inert, at worst misleading. It’s misleading if unpacked by analogy with the moral
separateness of persons. This is because, in that domain, even the most ardent proponents
of the separateness of persons don’t think that separateness yields a ban on trade-offs. It’s
inert if it remains a metaphor: it can’t do any argumentative work.
If the argumentative work is done elsewhere, it appears to be done by appeal to our
intuitive verdicts about cases such as Berker’s Scientist. But those verdicts are not
probative, for they fail to recognize that our intuitive verdicts about the existence of
epistemic reasons in particular cases can mislead when those verdicts aren’t tested against
the right (or indeed any) comparison cases. Once we introduce the relevant comparison
cases, we see that our intuitive verdicts tell in favor of a promotive conception of epistemic
rationality, i.e., one where trade-offs are at least in principle permissible.
Let me close with a remark that’s more confession than argument, but which is short. It
makes pre-theoretical sense to me to think the activity of trading off persons’ goods
requires special justification. After all, we’re dealing with a person and her welfare; of
course special justificatory caution is required in circumstances where we’re deliberately
considering harming a person (even when it’s to the benefit of others). At least, I have a
sense for why I might feel this way, pre-theoretically, even if I end up in a position where I
say otherwise. Why might this be? For one thing, and quite obviously, I am a person, and I
do not particularly want to suffer harm even for others’ benefit. For another, many of those
who I care about most are also persons, and I do not much want that they be cut up to save
the many. And even if I end up where the consequentialist in the practical domain wants me
to be, it’s important that I recognize the need to be talked into it. But, and maybe this is just
my cold and unsympathizing epistemic nature, I’m at a loss to make any good
pre-theoretical sense out of the idea that trading off one belief’s truth against another’s
requires, in a similar way, any sort of special justification. After all (I’m inclined to say)
we’re (just) dealing with a belief. Sure, the thought continues, I’m considering believing
falsely in order to believe truly about some other matters. But it is just belief, just some
mental state of mine; I am not the belief, nor are any who I care about most themselves
beliefs. So, unlike in the practical case, I don’t feel the need to be talked into the position the
epistemic consequentialist wants me to be in: I can happily start from there, and need to be
convinced otherwise.
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